In this paper the relation between the use of dual class shares and the risk of takeovers is explored. The results stress the need to control for the identity of the controlling owner in studies of corporate control and firm performance. For family controlled firms, it is found that both the hazard rate of takeover and firm market value decline with the wedge between the families' voting rights and cash flow rights. It is concluded that due to non-transferable private benefits of control in family firms, dual class shares reduce the likelihood that the family will accept the terms of value enhancing takeovers and this translates into lower firm value.
In this paper the relation between the use of dual class shares and the risk of takeovers is explored. The results stress the need to control for the identity of the controlling owner in studies of corporate control and firm performance. For family controlled firms, it is found that both the hazard rate of takeover and firm market value decline with the wedge between the families' voting rights and cash flow rights. It is concluded that due to non-transferable private benefits of control in family firms, dual class shares reduce the likelihood that the family will accept the terms of value enhancing takeovers and this translates into lower firm value.
I. Introduction
Recent financial research has examined the frequency of dual class shares, how dual class shares affect firm market value, and the relation between private benefits of control and the use of dual class shares.
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La Porta et al. (1999) , Claessens et al. (2000) , and Faccio and Lang (2002) show that dual class shares are common in many countries. Claessens et al. (2002) document that separation of ownership from control, such as from dual class shares, is associated with lower firm market values. Bebchuk et al. (2000) theoretically show how dual class shares and other mechanisms that separate ownership form control, such as pyramids and cross-holdings, increase the potential for private benefits of control. However, Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that proxy measures for the private benefits of control tend to be lower in countries where dual class are common. Therefore, the reason for a negative relation between the presence of dual class shares and firm market value remains an empirical question. Grossman and Hart (1988) argue that the main impact of a firm's security-voting structure will be in its influence on the market for corporate control. They theoretically show that dual class shares can reduce the likelihood of efficiency improving takeovers and argue that this reduced likelihood translates into lower firm market value. As far as is known the influence of dual class shares on the market for corporate control has not been empirically analysed in detail.
2 In this paper, the impact of dual class shares on the Swedish market for corporate control is examined.
Sweden provides an advantageous venue to explore the impact of dual class shares on takeover activity and firm market value. In La Porta et al.'s (1999) examination of the 27 richest countries in the world, Sweden ranks first in the use of dual class shares. Swedish firms typically issue two types of shares, A-shares that are one share -one vote and B-shares that typically carry 1/10 of a vote per share. Furthermore, empirical studies that attempt to measure the private benefits of control generally find that the private benefits of control in Sweden are among the lowest in the world (see Coffee, 2001; Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) . However, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find that firms with dual class shares are valued at a discount. Finally, Holmen and Ho¨gfeldt (2004) show that dual class shares are especially common among family firms in Sweden. Thus, dual class shares are common in Sweden, especially among family firms, they do not appear to be associated with substantial pecuniary private benefits of control, but they appear to be associated with lower firm market value. Given these results, the question naturally arises whether there are more to dual class shares than mere extraction of pecuniary benefits? The main contribution of this study is filling this void.
Based on Grossman and Hart (1988) two questions are outlined and tested about dual class shares and the market for corporate control. First, does an increased wedge between the controlling owner's voting rights and cash flow rights decrease the likelihood of a non-partial takeover? Second, is a negative relation between the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights and takeover risk stronger in family controlled firms? If the incumbent derives larger private benefits than the bidder, a wedge between the incumbent's number of voting rights and cash flow rights will reduce the likelihood of a successful takeover, ceteris paribus. The incumbent will derive larger private benefits if some of the benefits of control are non-transferable to the bidder. Generally, it is hypothesized that family firms are associated with more non-transferable private benefits of control.
A third research question concerns leverage and the market for corporate control. Dual class shares is not the only way for controlling shareholders to increase their voting rights in order to hinder successful tender offers. Stulz (1988) points out that debt can be used as a device that allows current owners to retain control of their firm. If the corporate charter does not allow dual class shares it may be easier for a large shareholder to increase his control of voting rights by increasing firm leverage than by changing the corporate charter. Thus, does increased firm leverage decrease the likelihood of a successful non-partial takeover? Family firms are likely to have greater incentives to use higher leverage as an anti-takeover device because of the desire of family members to protect their firm-specific human capital and family-specific private benefits of control such as the ability to hire relatives, the ability to transfer firm to heirs and the aspiration to enhance family name (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003; Denis and Denis, 1994) . 3 Family firms' incentives to use higher leverage could also be enhanced by the lower cost of debt financing relative to non-family firms (Anderson et al., 2003) . It is therefore expected that a negative relation between leverage and takeover probability is stronger for family controlled firms.
Other researchers have examined the probability of Anglo-Saxon firms being taken over. 4 Many Anglo-Saxon studies explicitly investigate the impact of the ownership structure of the firm on the likelihood of being taken over. 5 However, equity ownership cannot discriminate between the alignment of interest effect, which increases the probability that the controlling owner will accept a takeover bid involving a premium, and entrenchment effects, which decrease the probability that the controlling owner will relinquish control. By including the controlling owner's equity fraction as a proxy for incentive effects and the fraction of voting rights in excess of cash flow rights as a proxy for entrenchment effects earlier work on the relation between ownership structure and probability of takeovers is extended (see Claessens et al., 2002) .
Furthermore, little is known about takeover probability and the impact of ownership structure on the likelihood of being taken over outside the Anglo-Saxon countries. The concentrated ownership structure of firms in other countries is very different from the typical dispersed ownership structure in the USA and the UK (La Porta et al., 1999) . Typically, firms outside the Anglo-Saxon countries have a controlling shareholder, often a family that can block any takeovers attempts if the owner does not accept the terms of the bid.
6 This study will explore how family control impacts the likelihood of the firm being taken over.
3 A family member often acts as CEO in family controlled firms (La Porta et al., 1999) . 4 For the USA see e.g. Hasbrouck (1985) and Palepu (1986) . For UK results, see e.g. Powell (1997) . 5 For the USA see e.g. Walkling and Long (1984) , Walkling (1985) , Morck et al. (1989) , Mikkelson and Partch (1989) , Ambrose and Megginson (1992) , Shivdasani (1993) , Song and Walkling (1993) , Comment and Schwert (1995) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) . For UK results, see e.g. Weir (1997) and Sinha (2004) . 6 Sudarsanam (2003, p. 500) points out that factors such as corporate ownership structure and the absence of one share -one vote limit the incidence of hostile takeovers in many countries outside the USA and UK. He argues that '. . . negotiated and friendly bids are perhaps the most important, if not the only, bid strategy available . . .' All target firms in the non-partial takeovers in the present sample have a large shareholder and large shareholders can block a takeover in Sweden. Together with the fact that only successful takeovers are considered suggests that all takeovers in our sample are friendly, i.e. the controlling shareholder did not block the takeover.
Most of the existing financial economics literature on the likelihood of being taken over relies on binary choice models. Here, another approach is taken and estimate hazard rate of the takeover event. This has been done in the industrial organization literature by Dickerson et al. (2002) and in the statistical literature by Jaggia and Thosar (1995) but as far as the present authors know not in the financial economics literature. Panel data is used where a majority of the firms are not taken over during the sampling period. The hazard function approach allows it to be investigated whether, given that a firm has not been taken over up to a certain point, changes in particular characteristics (e.g. ownership) of the firm will lead to a takeover event.
An unbalanced panel of 200 large Swedish non-financial firms is used listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 1985-2000. The sample contains 1706 firm years. On average about 70% of the Swedish stock market capitalization is included in the sample each year. Forty-seven firms were subject to successful non-partial tender offers.
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The main results are as follows. First, family controlled firms have a higher hazard rate of takeover. Second, for family controlled firms the hazard rate of takeover is significantly reduced by the use of dual class shares and firm leverage. Furthermore, fixed effects regression models can be run with firm value as dependent variable. Firm value is approximated by Tobin's q. The results are remarkably similar to the estimated hazard rates. Family control per se is associated with higher Tobin's q. However, the value of family firms is significantly reduced by the use of dual class shares and firm leverage.
Given that the proxies for pecuniary private benefits are small in Sweden, it is concluded that family-owners' consumption of non-transferable and non-pecuniary benefits ('amenity potential') 8 is a likely explanation for the results, even though extraction of pecuniary benefits cannot be rules out. An increase in the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights reduces the likelihood that the family will accept a value enhancing takeover bid. Therefore, a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights translates into lower firm market value (see Grossman and Hart, 1988) . Thus, it is not necessarily the consumption of private benefits per se that reduces firm market value. Another possibility is that it is the reduced likelihood of value enhancing takeovers associated with dual class shares that drives the negative relation between dual class shares and firm market value. Similar arguments can be made for the negative relation between leverage and reduced likelihood of takeovers and firm value, respectively, for family firms (Stulz, 1988) .
The results are related to Claessens et al.'s (2002) results for East Asian firms. They document that dual class shares are associated with lower firm market values and interpret this in terms of entrenchment. Similarly for Sweden, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) document that controlling minority shareholders, who rely on dual class shares, are associated with worse firm performance. They argue that this is partly driven by the fact that dual class shares let the controlling shareholder hang on to control too long. The results suggest that this is indeed the case. This paper is also related to the growing empirical literature on how family control may affect firm behaviour and firm performance. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) document that founding family ownership improves firm performance. However, mounting evidence indicates that when the firm is controlled by the founders' descendents firm performance declines significantly (see Morck et al., 2000; Perez-Gonsalez, 2005; Fahlenbrach, 2004; Hillier and McColgan, 2005) .
9 Villalonga and Amit (2004) find that dual class shares, pyramids and voting agreements reduce the founder premium. In the light of this research, one plausible interpretation of the results is that dual class shares reduce the risk of takeovers and facilitate for founders to let less suited descendents inherit the firm. This interpretation would be consistent with the negative relation between the risk of takeover and firm value, respectively, and dual class shares.
The results are also related to the literature on the size of the private benefits of control. Empirical studies that attempt to measure the private benefits of control generally find that the private benefits of control in Sweden are among the lowest in the world (see Coffee, 2001; Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) . Morck et al. (2004) argue that entrenchment must stem from private benefits of control, i.e. if there are no private benefits of control the controlling 7 The relation between dual class shares and the Swedish market for corporate control has been investigated before by e.g. Rydqvist (1996) , Doukas et al. (2002) and Holmen and Knopf (2004) . However, none of these studies investigate the risk of takeover. 8 The term 'amenity potential,' suggested by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , refers to non-pecuniary private benefits of control. In our context it means utility to the families that does not come at the expense of firm profits. 9 Burkart et al. (2003) model the succession in a family firm owned and managed by its founder. When deciding to hire a professional manager or leaving control to his heir, the founder trades off that a professional is a better manager and the resulting agency costs associated with an outside manager.
shareholder has no incentives to entrench himself. The results indicate that the use of dual class shares entrench Swedish families. The voting premium (Nenova, 2003) and the premium paid in negotiated control block transfers (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) most likely capture pecuniary private benefits of control. The pecuniary private benefits in Sweden are probably small due to high accounting standards, tax compliance, and juridical standards. Furthermore, pecuniary private benefits should to a large extent be transferable to the bidder, i.e. the bidder should be willing to pay for pecuniary private benefits. If the private benefits associated with the controlling block were completely transferable it would be less likely that a negative relation be found between takeover risk and the use of dual class shares. Therefore the results are interpreted in terms of entrenchment stemming from non-transferable private benefits of control such as status, political influence, and power over people.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the hypotheses and the sample selection process used. The data and the variable definitions are also presented in the next section. Section III outlines the methodology used when hazard rates are estimated. In section IV the empirical results are reported in terms of hazard rates of takeovers and firm performance. Section V summarizes and concludes.
II. Hypotheses and Data
In this section the hypotheses are first outlined. Then the sample selection process is discussed and the sample compared to the population of takeovers on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In part C descriptive statistics are provided.
Hypotheses
The total value of the firm is the value of cash flow rights and the value of the private benefits of control. If a bidder can increase the value of the cash flow rights and the private benefits of control can be transferred from the incumbent to the bidder, the bidder can make an offer that the incumbent will accept. The incumbent will be compensated for the lost private benefits of control. However, if the private benefits are not transferable to the bidder, at least not completely, it is no longer evident that the bidder can make on offer the incumbent will accept (see Grossman and Hart, 1988) .
In order to develop a testable hypothesis three main assumptions are made. First, in line with Grossman and Hart (1988) it is assumed that only one party at a time can derive substantial private benefits of control. Second, it is assumed that the private benefits are related to the largest control block in the firm, i.e. the largest voting block.
10 Third, it is assumed that not all private benefits are transferable to the bidder. This resembles the case discussed by Grossman and Hart (1988) where the incumbent derives more private benefits than the bidder. Then, even if the bidder can increase the value of the cash flow rights, the incumbent will not accept a takeover bid as long as his net loss of private benefits exceeds the premium the bidder offers to pay on the incumbent cash flow rights. The net loss is the value of the private benefits to the incumbent minus the price the bidder is willing to pay for them. Grossman and Hart (1988) show that the willingness of the incumbent to accept a takeover bid declines with a decrease in cash flow rights attached to the controlling voting block. In other words, given a certain incremental increase in the value of each cash flow right, the fewer cash flow rights the incumbent owns, the less likely will this increase compensate the incumbent for the private benefits that the bidder is not willing to pay for, i.e. non-transferable private benefits.
11 This is the motivation for the main hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The larger the wedge between the controlling shareholder's ownership of voting rights and cash flow rights, the lower the hazard rate of takeover.
It should be noted that this hypothesis is based on the assumption that some of the private benefits are non-transferable. If the bidder would derive as much 10 Acording to Becht and Mayer (2001) , in 50% of the large Swedish companies more than 34.9% of votes are controlled by a single blockholder. In contrast, the median size of the second largest voting block is 8.7%. 11 A similar prediction can be generated based on Burkart et al. (1998) who show that in a takeover bid, minority shareholders would prefer bidders to accumulate larger cash flow rights to deter them from post-acquisition private benefit extraction. In contrast, bidders would prefer to minimize their cash flow ownership while accumulating sufficient votes to control the firm in order to minimize the internalization of value consequences of post-acquisition rent extraction. In the present context, the presence of a controlling shareholder with a large amount of voting rights relative to cash flow rights increases the chances of the bidder to attain her goals. Yet, this is likely to be anticipated by minority shareholders who would attempt to block a takeover attempt. The ease of blocking a non-partial takeover attempt in Sweden indicates that the likelihood of takeover is likely to be inversely related to the wedge between cash flow and voting rights of a controlling shareholder. private benefits as the incumbent, he could compensate the incumbent for the lost private benefits and all efficiency improving takeovers would go through. Private benefits such as status, prestige, social standing and political influence are probably difficult to transfer, at least completely. For example, the status associated with having a large listed firm carrying the family name is probably not transferable to someone outside the family (see Barclay et al., 1993) . Generally, it is assumed that the non-transferable benefits of control should be larger in family controlled firms. Therefore, a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights should reduce the risk of takeover more in family firms than in non-family firms, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2: A negative relation between the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights and takeover risk will be stronger for family controlled firms.
Sample selection
The study commences with an unbalanced panel dataset containing accounting data for 211 large non-financial Swedish firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 1985-2001. The accounting data is collected from the Findata Trust database. The sample contains the vast majority of the largest non-financial public firms during this time-period. Some large firms that were only listed for one or two years before delisting are not included in the sample.
The accounting data is combined with ownership data from Sundqvist (1985 Sundqvist ( -1993 and Sundin and Sundqvist (1994-2001) . This source reports the 25 largest owners in all listed firms as of January each year. After the collection of ownership data the sample is reduced to 200 firms and 1706 firm years.
A first rough estimate of takeover activity is also collected from Sundin and Sundqvist (1986-2001) since they report all delistings. However, they do not distinguish between actual takeovers, minority buyouts, and going private transactions. Interest here is only in transactions where there has been a change in control, i.e. not the minority buyouts and going private transactions. To separate going private transactions from actual takeovers daily newspapers are used. 12 The ownership structure of the firm the years preceding the delisting is also examined. If a firm is delisted in year t after a successful non-partial tender offer and the investor making the tender offer was not the largest voteholder in the beginning of year t À 1 the event is defined as a successful non-partial takeover. If the investor making the tender offer was the largest voteholder in the beginning of year t À 1 the event is defined as a going private transaction, not as a takeover.
In Sweden, almost all non-partial takeovers are preceded by a public tender offer (Bergstro¨m and Rydqvist, 1989) . According to Swedish law, any shareholder or group of shareholders in the target, who has 10% of the shares, can block a merger. Therefore, the terms of the tender offer are often negotiated between the bidder and the large shareholders of the target before the public announcement. When the large blockholders have accepted the terms of the bid, a follow-up tender offer is made for all target shares, including the blockholders' shares (Rydqvist, 1993) . Most bids are non-partial and are contingent upon 90% of the shareholders accepting the offer. The fact that only successful takeovers are considered suggests that all takeovers in the sample are friendly.
Thus, the hypotheses are not based on the argument that dual class shares hinder hostile takeovers since hostile takeovers could in principle be blocked already at 10% of firm equity. The average controlling shareholder in the sample holds more than 30% of firm equity. Instead, the hypothesis is based on the assumption that deviations from one share -one vote make it less likely that the bidder will be able to make a friendly bid that the incumbent will accept.
The bidder is not allowed to discriminate between the controlling shareholder's and the minority shareholders' low voting stock. However, the bidder can discriminate between high voting stock, mainly held by the controlling shareholder, and low voting stock, mainly held by minority shareholders. Therefore, the bidder can compensate the incumbent for the loss of private benefits of control. However, if the private benefits are not transferable to the bidder, he will not be willing to pay for them.
The final takeover sample consists of 47 successful non-partial takeovers. In the total sample 24 firms were subject to minority buyouts, three firms went bankrupt and one firm was restructured due to financial distress. Table 1 panel A summarizes the sample used. On average the sample contains roughly 100 firms each year, of which three firms are taken over each year. The sample comprises roughly 70% of the Swedish stock market capitalization. However, column 5 indicates that only roughly 25% of all successful non-partial takeovers events on the 12 Part of this data were provided by Kristian Rydqvist. Stockholm Stock Exchange during this time period are included. The sample mainly contains the large firms for which financial statements and ownership data tend to be more readily available. Since many small firms had been acquired during the period of investigation the sample coverage of takeover events is reduced.
In panel B the frequency of non-partial takeovers bids on Stockholm Stock Exchange is summarized. On average 13 firms are taken over each year. Thus, roughly 5% of the firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange are taken over each year. In percentage of market value, the number drops to 3%, i.e. 3% of the market value on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is taken over each year. The difference indicates that the typical takeover involves a small target firm. In market value terms (column 6 in panel A) the sample on average comprises more than 50% of the takeovers on the Stockholm Stock Exchange during the investigated period. Some big (market value) takeovers are not included in the sample. For example, not included are four big takeovers of banks in 1990, four big takeovers of financial institutions in 1997, and three takeovers of highly valued information technology firms in 2000.
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As far as the authors know, the only major nonpartial takeover of a large Swedish non-financial firm listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange not included in the sample is the takeover of Pharmacia by the USA pharmaceutical firm Upjohn in 1995. A restructured Pharmacia was listed in 1993 and then delisted in 1995. Hence, there is only one year of complete accounting data for Pharmacia as a listed firm before delisting. Therefore, Pharmacia was never included in the original sample. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 200 firms and 1706 firm years in the sample. The median controlling shareholder holds 29% of the cash flow rights (Equity) and almost 50% of the voting rights (Votes). The difference is a result of the high frequency of dual class shares. Dual class shares are held by 79% of the firms in the sample (see panel B). On average, the largest shareholder holds 16.6% Excess Votes, i.e. voting rights in excess of cash flow rights.
Descriptive statistics
A shareholder could block a takeover by holding 10% of the votes. If 20% of the firm's stock had ten votes per share and the other 80% were one-share one-vote, 10% of the votes could be achieved by holding less than 3% of the cash flow rights (see Bergstro¨m and Rydqvist, 1990) . Since the median controlling shareholder holds 50% of the votes and 29% of the cash flow rights there are clearly other things than the possibility to block a takeover that influences the controlling owner's investment decision. For example, holding 50% or more of the votes gives the controlling shareholder full control of the firm.
14 Given dual class shares, 50% of the votes could be achieved with a much smaller investment in cash flow rights than 29%. However, Zingales (1995) shows that the controlling owner needs to hold a certain fraction of the cash flow rights in order to have incentives to sell the firm when it is efficient to do so. 15 The controlling owner must find the optimal balance between voting rights and cash flow rights. Thus, the optimal balance is not to minimize the investment in cash flow rights given a certain fraction of the voting rights. This balance might also vary with ownership and firm characteristics.
The median firm has assets with a book value of 1525 million SEK (Size), is 47 years old (Age), invests an amount equal to 8.5% of total assets (Investment), generates a return of 12.4% return on total assets (Profitability), has financed 23.7% of total assets with long term debt (Leverage), has 56.4% of total assets in short term assets (Liquidity), and has a Tobin's q of 1.146. Tobin's q is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets.
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The sample is split by whether the firm was subject to a successful non-partial tender offer 1985-2000 (47 firms). All firm years (N ¼ 425) prior to the successful non-partial takeover are classified as belonging to a takeover target. The median difference test suggests that the controlling owners in takeover targets have more cash flow rights than controlling owners of firms that are not taken over. Given the premium paid in takeovers, the larger the equity stake the more the controlling shareholder has to gain from relinquishing control, ceteris paribus. In the average firm not taken over, the controlling shareholder has more Excess Votes than the average controlling 13 Banks in 1990: Nordbanken, Ska˚nska banken, Wermlandsbanken, Skaraborgsbanken; Financial Institutions in 1997: Stadshypotek, Trygg Hansa, Fo¨reningsbanken, Ö stgo¨ta Enskilda Bank; Information Technology firms in 2000; Cell, Connecta, Entra Data. 14 Operational control might be reached at e.g. 25% of the votes (see e.g. Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003) . 15 In the sample, the median controlling shareholder in a dual class firm holds roughly equal amounts of A shares and B-shares. 16 It is not uncommon that the high voting A-shares are not traded on the stock exchange. Non-traded shares have been assigned the market price of traded B-shares when calculating the total market value of equity. The voting premium in Sweden is on average 1% (Nenova, 2003) . However, Rydqvist (1996) shows that the voting premium can be substantial at control contests. Even if takeovers are considered market values are collected at the beginning of the year, i.e. not in connection with a takeover bid. Thus, assigning the market price of B-shares to non-traded A shares should not bias the Tobin's q estimate significantly.
shareholder being taken over. This casual observation suggests that dual class shares reduce the risk of takeovers. The medians are however not statistically different.
The median firm being taken over is larger than the median firm not being taken over.
17 And firms being taken over are older than firms not being taken over. The mean difference in terms Tobin's q is driven by extreme valuesthe median difference suggests no significant difference.
In panel B statistics for three binary variables are reported. Two-thirds of the firms in the sample have a family, an individual or a group of individuals as Table 2 . Descriptive statistics large Swedish non-financial firms [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] In this table summary statistics for the 200 firms and 1706 firm years in our samples are provided. The sample is split by whether the firm was subject to a successful non-partial tender offer 1985-2000 (47 firms). All firm years (N ¼ 425) prior to the successful non-partial takeover are classified as belonging to a takeover target. Equity is defined as the controlling shareholder's (largest voteholder) fraction of cash flow rights in the firm. Votes is defined as the controlling shareholder's fraction of voting rights in the firm. Excess Votes is defined as Votes minus Equity. Firm Size is defined as the book value of total assets in Million SEK. Firm Age is defined as the number of years since the firm was founded. Investment is defined as total capital expenditure divided by the book value of total assets. Profitaility is equal to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Depreciation (EBITD) divided by the book value of total assets. Leverage is equal to the value of long term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity is equal to the value of short term assets divided by the book value of total assets. Toin's q is defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Family is equal to one if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a family, an individual, or a group of individuals, and zero otherwise. Dual Class Shares is equal to one if the firm has issued shares with differential voting rights, and zero otherwise. Controlling owner holds all A-Shares is equal to one if the controlling owner holds all A-shares (high voting shares) and zero otherwise. Median Difference tested by means of Wilcoxon-Ranksum test. a Mean difference tested on the natural logarithm of these variables. Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 17 Note that mean differences are tested on the natural logarithm of Firm Size, Firm Age and Tobin's q. The t-test on the mean differences in the natural logarithm of Firm Size indicates that firms being takeover targets are larger than firms not being takeover targets even if average Firm Size per se is larger for firms not being takeover targets.
controlling shareholder (Family). A firm is classified as family-controlled when there is a traceable family or other group of individuals who ultimately controls the largest voting block of shares in the corporation. 18 Admittedly, in firms with a passive financial institution as the largest shareholder, a family with the second largest voting block may still hold a considerable influence. However, when a financial institution is the largest shareholder, typically the other large shareholders are also financial institutions and there are no families among the largest shareholders. Furthermore, even when a financial institution is the largest vote holder, its vote fraction is generally much smaller than for controlling families. Thus, even if a family would be the second largest vote holder, the family's vote fraction would on average be only half of families being the largest vote holder.
The source for the ownership data (Sundin and Sundqvist) provides detailed information on coalition structures and families in a wide sense. Thus, if two families are known to cooperate their shareholdings are aggregated in Sundin and Sundqvist. Their definitions of ownership coalitions have been followed. 19 The case for aggregating the ownership of different ownership categories (independent of coalitions structures), when classifying firms into different ownership types, is less strong since the Swedish corporate law does not allow for cumulative voting when the board of directors is elected (La Porta et al., 1998) . Thus, different families can cast their votes on the same candidates when the board of directors is elected, but a certain family cannot cast all its votes on a particular candidate.
Almost 80% of the firms have dual class shares. In 28.2% of the firms, the controlling shareholders hold all A-shares and only the B-shares are traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In roughly 40% of the dual class firms the controlling shareholder holds all A-shares. The median controlling shareholder in the dual class firms holds 75% of the A-shares in the firm. Dual class shares are held by 85% of the family firms while roughly 69% of non-family firms have dual class shares. The difference is statistically highly significant.
Family firms are less likely to be taken over according to a simple proportion test. Dual class firms are more likely to be taken over. These statistics indicate that it is not dual class shares per se that work as anti-takeover mechanisms. However, the degree to which the controlling owner separates his ownership of voting rights from his ownership of cash flow rights (Excess Votes) might be related to the probability of a successful takeover. Furthermore, if the controlling shareholder holds all A-shares, the firm is also more likely to be taken over. This is consistent with Zingales' (1995) argument that it is easier for the controlling owner to receive an acceptable compensation for his control rights if the control block is complete.
III. Methodology
In the empirical investigation the objective is to model factors explaining the likelihood of a firm being taken over. The methods developed in the subject of survival analysis appear to be the appropriate tools for the analysis (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 1996) . Survival analysis deals with the modelling of time-to-event data, also known as transition data (or survival time data or duration data). A time domain for firms is considered, which can be partitioned into two mutually-exclusive states at each point in time -the status-quo state and the state of takeover. With the passage of time, firms transit (or do not transit) from one state to the other.
The empirical analysis of the data available calls for methods which directly account for the sequential nature of the data, and are able to handle censoring and incorporate time-varying covariates. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of survival times and binary dependent variable regression models (e.g. logit, probit) with transition occurrence as the dependent variable have important shortcomings in handling those issues. OLS cannot efficiently utilize information from censored observations. Censored observations in the present case are represented by the companies, which have not experienced the event of takeover while remaining at risk of such an event at the end of the observation period. Moreover, since OLS has only a single dependent variable it cannot efficiently handle timevarying covariates.
Finally, there might be clearly a behavioural aspect in the event of takeover being considered. Therefore it would be preferable to formulate the model in terms of transition between alternative states instead of in terms of completed spell lengths. Binary dependent variable models can overcome most of the problems 18 Consistent with the Holderness and Sheehan's (1988) study of the role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations for firms where the largest shareholder is a family or other group of individuals, managerial and non-managerial shareholders are not distinguished between (the vast majority of the family owners are insiders). 19 Bergstro¨m and Rydqvist (1990) used a similar principle for grouping Swedish shareholders into coalitions. related to OLS but fail to account efficiently for the differences in time each firm in the sample was subject to takeover risk.
The solution to the problems mentioned above in the present context is to model survival times of the firms indirectly, via the 'hazard rate of takeover'. The hazard rate captures firms' chances of being taken over at each instant (or time period) conditional on survival up to that point.
The unconditional probability of not being taken over from the start of the observation period (t ¼ 0) until time t > 0 for firm i in our sample is equal to i (t)dt, where i (t) is the hazard function defined by the equation
and dt is an infinitesimal interval of time. Alternatively, i (t)dt can be interpreted as an unconditional probability of a firm i being taken over in tiny interval of time [t, t þ dt]. The (instantaneous) hazard rate function for firm i at time t > 0 is assumed to take the proportional hazards form i ðtÞ ¼ 0 ðtÞ expðX 0 it Þ where 0 (t) is the unknown baseline hazard at time t which may take a parametric or nonparametric form, 20 and X it is a vector of covariates summarizing observed differences between firms at time t; and is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
Note that the probability density function in the present context is a time to failure function that gives the instantaneous probability of the event. That is, in a survival experiment where the event is firm takeover, the value of the density function at time T is the probability that a firm will be taken over precisely at time T. This differs from the hazard function, which gives the probability conditional on a firm having survived to time T. In this paper the terms 'hazard rate of takeover' or 'takeover risk' are used instead of 'takeover probability' since what is being modelled is the probability per time unit that a firm that has survived to the beginning of the respective interval will be taken over in that interval.
Although survival of firms occurs in continuous time, the data calls for the discrete time specification of the model given that the spell length is observed only in one-year intervals. In other words, the underlying continuous durations are only observed in disjoint time intervals [0 ¼ a 0 , a 1 ), [a 1 , a 2 ), [a 2 , a 3 ), . . . , [a kÀ1 , a k ¼ 1). The covariates (e.g. firms' characteristics) may vary between time intervals but are assumed to be constant within each of them.
In the discrete case, hazard of exit in the jth interval is given by
All intervals have length of one year for the present case, so the recorded duration for each firm i corresponds to the interval [t iÀ1 , t i ). Firms are recorded as either being taken over during the interval, or as still remaining a potential takeover targets. The former group, contributing completed spell data, are identified using censoring indicator c i ¼ 1. For the latter group, contributing rightcensored spell data, c i ¼ 0. The number of intervals comprising a censored spell is defined here to include the last interval within which the firm is observed.
The log-likelihood can be written in terms of the hazard function as:
where the discrete time hazard in the jth interval is
This specification allows for a fully non-parametric baseline hazard with a separate parameter for each duration interval. 21 Alternatively, the j may be described by some semi-parametric or parametric function, e.g. (j).
20 Non-parametric specification for the duration dependency of the hazard rate tend to be more reliable than parametric one because it does not tightly constrain the general shape of the baseline hazard function. Moreover, conclusions about the significance of unobserved heterogeneity are more reliably drawn when a flexible specification for the baseline hazard has been used.
Defining an indicator variable y it ¼ 1 if firm i is taken over during the interval [t À 1, t], y it ¼ 0 otherwise, then the log-likelihood can be rewritten in sequential binary response form:
This is one specification of log-likelihood, which is estimated.
The second specification incorporates a Gamma distributed random variables to describe unobserved (or omitted) heterogeneity between individuals. The instantaneous hazard rate is now specified as
where " i is a Gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and variance 2 v, and the discretetime hazard function is now
The likelihood function of the second model is:
and
where ( j) is a function describing duration dependence in the hazard rate. The first model's loglikelihood function is the limiting case as ! 0. Alternative methodologies to test the hypotheses would be to examine failed tender offers or compare the bid premium on A and B shares. There are only eight failed bids within the sample which makes a meaningful analysis difficult. Furthermore, the main interest is in whether dual class shares reduce the likelihood of tender offers actually taking place. The hypotheses are based on the conjecture that potential bidders choose not to make a tender offer after negotiations with the incumbent in dual class firms. Alternatively, potential bidders do not even start negotiations with the incumbent.
Examining the bid premium on A-shares is often difficult since the A-shares are often not listed, i.e. the market price is not observed. This could to some extent be handled by comparing the tender offer price for the A-shares to the tender offer price on the B-shares. However, when the A-shares are not traded the bidder and the incumbent do not have to disclose the tendered price. Thus, it is difficult to collect this type of data.
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IV. Empirical Results
In this section we first estimate the risk of takeovers using the hazard regressions models. We then run fixed effect regressions with Tobin's q and profitability as dependent variables to test whether firm performance is related to the same variables that prove to be related to the probability of takeovers.
The probability of a takeover
In this section the results of estimation of discrete time proportional hazards regression models are reported with the hazard rate of takeover as dependent variable.
23 Several independent variables are included. Families most likely hold under-diversified portfolios to a larger extent than non-family owners. They therefore have incentive to sell their control block and diversify their portfolios. However, families most likely derive more non-transferable private benefits of control than non-family owners. This would suggest that they have less incentive to sell their control block since they will not be compensated 22 Out of sample and unreported tests of the bid premium at 54 successful non-partial tender offers of dual -class firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 1986 Exchange -2004 suggest that the extra premium offered on the A-shares (tender offer price on A-shares above tender offer price on B-shares) is negatively correlated with the tender offer premium on the B-shares (offered price on B-shares above market price). Thus, there appears to be a substituting effect where the extra premium paid on the A-shares are taken from the premium on the B-shares. 23 The models are estimated using pgmhaz8 procedure of STATA 8.2. For each specification, two models are estimated by maximum likelihood methods: (1) the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model; and (2) the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unobserved individual heterogeneity, as proposed by Meyer (1990) . Fully non-parametric specification is estimated for the baseline hazard with four interval-specific baseline hazards.
for non-transferable private benefits. It is an empirical question whether the incentives to diversify the family's portfolio is stronger than the incentives to hang on to the private benefits of control. Therefore a Family dummy variable is included in all estimated models. It is equal to one if a family, an individual or a group of individuals control the firm, and zero otherwise.
The first hypothesis is that the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights caused by the use of dual class shares reduces the probability that the incumbent will accept the price the bidder is willing to pay. Included is the difference between the incumbent's fraction of voting rights and cash flow rights (Excess Votes) to test this hypothesis. If the bidder is not willing to pay for (all of) the private benefits associated with the largest voting block by paying a higher bid premium on the superior voting stock, the incumbent has to be compensated for the loss of private benefits by the premium on his cash flow rights. Thus, Excess Votes will capture the reduction in the incumbent's incentive to accept a certain bid premium on the cash flow rights as his number of cash-flow rights decreases.
The alternative hypothesis is that higher Excess Votes mean that the incumbent has kept all or almost all of the high voting A-shares. If this is the case it would facilitate for the incumbent to capture all of the proceeds from the sale of control rights and thereby it would increase the likelihood of a successful takeover, ceteris paribus (Zingales, 1995) .
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Excess Votes is the difference between the fraction of voting rights (Votes) and the fraction of cash flow rights (Equity). Thus, Excess Votes can e.g. be equal to 0.20 when Votes is equal to 0.5 and Equity equal to 0.3. Excess Votes would also be equal to 0.20 when Votes is equal to 0.30 and Equity is equal to 0.1. However, the relation to the risk of takeover might differ between these two examples. Therefore Equity is included in all the estimated models.
Previous studies that examine the relation between the risk of takeovers and ownership structure use the manager's or the largest shareholder's equity fraction. This variable captures both an alignment of interest effect and an entrenchment effect. In these tests entrenchment effects should be captured by Excess Votes, while Equity should capture the alignment of interest effect.
The second hypothesis is that the negative relation between the use of dual class shares (Excess Votes) and the hazard rate of takeovers should be stronger for family controlled firms. The reason is that it is assumed that families derive more non-transferable private benefits of control. In model specifications M3-M6 in Table 3 interaction terms are included between Family and Non-family control and Excess Votes and Equity, respectively.
Based on Stulz (1988) it is also tested whether firm Leverage is related to the hazard rate of takeover. By increasing firm leverage the controlling shareholder can increase his control of voting rights and thereby hindering takeovers. In the family controlled firms family members often take an active part in firm management and at a takeover the family members will lose their jobs and firm-specific human capital. The family therefore has stronger incentives as well as opportunities to manipulate firm leverage in order to hinder takeovers. Thus, a negative relation is expected between leverage and the hazard rate of takeover to be stronger for family firms. Therefore interaction terms are included between Leverage and the Family and Non-Family indicator variables in M5 and M6.
Firm Size, Firm Age, Investment level, Profitability (ROA), and Liquidity are included as control variables. These are roughly the same control variables as the variables used by e.g. Palepu (1986) , Ambrose and Megginson (1992) , and Dickerson et al. (2002) when estimating the probability of takeovers. Table 3 reports the results of estimation of proportional hazards regression models with non-parametric baseline hazard specification. Accounting for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity across firms on the takeover hazard proves to be an appropriate strategy. The likelihood ratio test of the size of the variance of the gamma mixture distribution suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is significant in all model specifications. Although the parameters' significance does not change greatly with the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity, comparing the models reveals that the impact of covariates on the hazard rate of takeover tend to be larger in the models accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. The later result is not unexpected as it is in line with the predictions of econometric theory Table 3 . Estimated models of the hazard rate of takeover
In this table models are reported estimating the hazard rate of the firm being subject to a successful non-partial tender offer. The sample consists of 200 firms and 1706 firm years. 47 firms were subject to successful non-partial tender offers. Models are reported without unobserved heterogeneity (M1, M3, and M5) and with Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity (M2, M4, and M6), respectively. Coefficients are reported with z-statistics in parenthesis. Family is equal to one if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a family, an individual, or a group of individuals, and zero otherwise. Equity is defined as the controlling shareholder's (largest voteholder) fraction of cash flow rights in the firm. Votes is defined as the controlling shareholder's fraction of voting rights in the firm. Excess Votes is defined as Votes minus Equity. Firm Size is defined as the book value of total assets in Million SEK. Firm Age is defined as the number of years since the firm was founded. Investment is defined as total capital expenditure divided by the book value of total assets. Profitaility is equal to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, and Depreciation (EBITD) divided by the book value of total assets. Leverage is equal to the value of long term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity is equal to the value of short term assets divided by the book value of total assets. Toin's q is defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets, T80 is equal to one for the years before 1990 and zero otherwise. The duration dependency of hazard rate is captured by four dummy variables corresponding to four-year duration intervals. Ln denotes the natural logarithm. Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(e.g. Lancaster, 1990) . Non-parametric duration dependency of hazard rate in all models is significant and positive.
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According to the results in M1 and M2 the hazard rate of takeover do not differ between family firms and other firms, i.e. the Family dummy is insignificant. Excess Votes is also insignificant in M1 and M2. This result is inconsistent with the first hypothesis. Equity is positive and significant at the 10 (5)% level in M1 (M2). The more cash flow rights the incumbent possesses the higher the hazard rate of takeover which is consistent with controlling owner's equity fraction as a proxy for incentive effects and Zingales (1995) .
Family-controlled companies experience a greater hazard of takeover relative to other firms when interaction terms between Family and Excess Votes and Equity, respectively, are included (M3-M6). Nevertheless, family-controlled firms are associated with effects that decrease the probability of successful takeover. Unlike in other companies, the increase in the wedge between voting power and equity share of ultimate family owners significantly reduces takeover hazard. The Family Ã Excess Votes interaction term is negatively significant. This is consistent with non-transferable private benefits in family firms and in support of the second hypothesis.
The results also indicate that the positive relation between the incumbent's equity stake on takeover hazard (M1 and M2) is driven by non-family controlled firms. The equity stake of family owners does not have any effect on the probability of takeover (M3-M6).
As suggested by Stulz (1988) and empirically documented in the USA by e.g. Palepu (1986) , an increase in leverage of Swedish companies works as a successful anti-takeover device. Yet, the comparison of M1 and M2 with M5 and M6 in Table 3 reveal that the negative effect of leverage on the probability of a takeover is driven by the family-controlled firms. The Family Ã Leverage interaction term is negatively significant in M5 and M6. Thus is appears as if leverage is associated with reduced takeover risk only in family controlled firms. This result is consistent with the argument that only family owners, due to their active part in firm management and firm specific human capital, use leverage as an anti-takeover device.
A somewhat surprising finding arising from these results is that ownership stake, voting power, and leverage are the only significant determinates of successful takeover. Control factors such as firm's size and age, profitability, investments, liquidity, Tobin q, and calendar effects do not have any significant effect on the takeover hazard in the model. The next section investigates the relationship between Tobin's q and the other independent variables in Table 3 . Therefore a return is made for all the models in Table 3 excluding Tobin's q. It does not change the results.
Firm market value
The results in Table 3 indicate that the risk of takeover is significantly reduced with the controlling family's excess votes. This section explores whether the use of dual class shares also is related to firm market value. Grossman and Hart (1988) note that since a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights decrease the likelihood of value enhancing takeovers, the value of the firm's securities will decrease. The hypothesis is therefore that the reduced risk of a takeover is discounted by investors and therefore it is expected to find a negative relation between the extent to which families use dual class shares and firm market value.
Firm market value is approximated by the natural logarithm of Tobin's q (Allayanis and Weston, 2001) . The same independent variables as in the hazard rate models in Table 3 are used. Reliance is on fixed effect regressions as suggested by Himmelberg et al. (1999) . Fixed effect estimates adjust for the possibility that unobservable firm-specific factors influence the level of Tobin's q in each individual firm and are equivalent to estimating OLS models and including an indicator variable for each firm. Zhou (2001) argues that ownership variables vary significantly across firms but relatively little within firms. It is therefore unlikely that within (fixed effects) estimates panel tests will show any relations between ownership and performance even when it does in fact exist. However, there are 16 years of data and some variations in the ownership variables. Furthermore, an F-test indicates that there are indeed firm-specific fixed effects. Pooling the data and estimating OLS without firm dummies would result in biased estimates. Finally, the Hausman test rejects that the firm-specific fixed effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, which makes random effect estimations unsuitable.
The results are reported in Table 4 panel A. In M1 Excess Votes is negatively significant in line with the hypothesis and earlier results (Claessens et al., 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003) . However, M2 and M3 indicate that it is only for families that Excess Votes is associated with a reduced firm market value.
The Family Ã Excess Votes interaction term is negatively significant while the Nonfamily Ã Excess Votes is insignificant.
When the Excess votes and Equity interaction terms are included, the Family indicator variable becomes positively significant. Thus, family control per se is associated with higher market value, consistent with US results (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a) . However, when the family relies on dual class shares to keep control the positive effect of family control is significantly reduced. Similar results are reported for Fortune 500 firms controlled by families (Villalonga and Amit, 2004) .
The Equity variable is negatively significant in M1. When Family Ã Equity and Nonfamily Ã Equity interaction terms are included in M2 Family Ã Equity remains negatively significant while the Nonfamily Ã Equity is insignificant. The alignment of interest effect suggests that Equity should be positive (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Burkart et al., 1998) . Yet a negative effect may occur if blockholdings above a certain level leads to excessive risk aversion or risk avoidance due to the blockowners' risk exposure (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bolton and von Thadden, 1998) . 26 Anderson and Reeb (2003b) document that family owners often hold poorly diversified portfolios.
Leverage is negatively significant at the 10% level in M1 and M2. When including Family Ã Leverage and Nonfamily Ã Leverage interaction terms in M3 Family Ã Leverage is negatively significant while Nonfamily Ã Leverage is insignificant. This is the same pattern as in the estimated hazard models in Table 3 . Thus, it appears as if the use of dual class shares and leverage in family firms reduce the likelihood of value enhancing takeovers and that both mechanisms are discounted by outside investors.
Firm value is negatively related to Firm Size and Firm Age while positively related to Profitability and Investment level. This corroborates earlier results (see e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003) . The Liquidity variable is insignificant.
Operating performance
In this section is explored whether the negative relation between firm value and dual class shares and firm leverage, respectively, is explained by lower operating performance. Grossman and Hart (1988) show that dual class shares can reduce the likelihood of efficiency improving takeovers and argue that this reduced likelihood translates into lower firm market value, ceteris paribus. Thus, dual class shares per se do not necessarily lead to worse operating performance. However, dual class shares may at some time in the future hinder a takeover that could have improved operating performance and this is discounted by investors. In other words, the likelihood that the shareholders will receive a takeover premium is reduced. If the negative relation between dual class shares and firm market value indeed stem from lower likelihood of efficiency improving takeovers per se, it would be expected to find no significant relation between dual class shares and operating performance. The same argument can be made for the negative relation between leverage and firm market value.
First Profitability in M4-M6 is excluded in In Table 4 panel B fixed effect regression models are estimated with Profitability as dependent variable. The same independent variables are used as in panel A. No indications are found that dual class shares (Excess Votes) are related to operating performance. Neither are indications found that the largest shareholder's Equity fraction is related to operating performance. This is further evidence that the negative relation between dual class shares and firm market value indeed stem from the lower takeover probability estimated in Table 3 .
Family control is positively related to Profitability (M1 and M3) while Leverage and Firm Age are negatively related to Profitability. The negative relation between Leverage and Profitability is twice as strong for family firms (À0.17 compared to À0.086). Thus, part of the negative relation between Leverage and firm value for family firms in panel A is driven by lower operating performance. However, in M3 panel A Profitability is controlled for and 26 The Family Ã Excess Votes variable only captures to what extent the family has voting rights in excess of cash flow rights. It does not capture how concentrated the ownership really is, i.e. even if the family holds 5% or 50% of the firm's cash flow rights, Excess Votes can be 0.2. Excess Votes is defined as Votes minus Equity. Firm Size is defined as the book value of total assets in Million SEK. Firm Age is defined as the number of years since the firm was founded. Investment is defined as total capital expenditure divided by the book value of total assets. Leverage is equal to the value of long term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Liquidity is equal to the value of short term assets divided by the book value of total assets. Ln denotes the natural logarithm. Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Family Ã Leverage is still negatively significant at the 5% level.
Summing up the main results in Table 3 and  Table 4 : Family control per se is associated with a higher risk of takeover and higher market value; however, when the family uses dual class shares, both the risk of takeover and firm market value decrease; the same pattern for leverage in family controlled firm is observed -when family firms increase their leverage, both the risk of takeover and firm market value decrease. No relation between dual class shares and return on assets is found indicating that the discount associated with dual class shares does not stem from poor operating performance.
V. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper the Swedish market for corporate control is investigated and the links between firms' market value, dual class shares, and controlling shareholders' type explored. Hazard functions are estimated on an unbalanced panel of large Swedish non-financial firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 1985-2000. In all test a distinction is made between family control and non-family control. First, it is found that family controlled firms have a higher hazard rate of takeover. Second, in family controlled firms the use of dual class shares and leverage are associated with reduced hazard rate of takeover. Run-fixed effects regression models were also run with Tobin's q as dependent variable. Family control per se is associated with higher Tobin's q. However, in family firms the use of dual class shares and leverage are associated with reduced firm value. A general implication of the results is that they stress the need to control for the identity of the controlling owner in studies of corporate control and firm performance.
Even though extraction of pecuniary benefits cannot be ruled out, it is concluded that family-owners' consumption of non-transferable and non-pecuniary benefits of control is a more likely explanation for the results. Families derive private benefits of control such as status, political influence, and power over people. The consumption of such non-pecuniary benefits does not necessary decrease takeover probability and the firm value. In fact, family control per se tends to be associated with an increased likelihood of a takeover and higher firm market value. Furthermore, the proxies for (pecuniary) private benefits are small in Sweden. Nevertheless, non-transferable private benefits of control together with deviations from one share-one vote, reduce the likelihood that value enhancing takeovers go through. The reduced likelihood of value enhancing takeovers translates into lower firm market value.
